Description
With the Iraq War now in its fourth year, its merits are still contested by leading politicians in the U.S. and elsewhere. And revelations suggest that the president's secretary of state, Colin Powell, had opposed going to war. Historians have often analyzed the relationship between presidents and their advisors, but rarely the influence of those counselors who have dissented from the views of the chief executive. Mark J. White considers the question of alternative policies by examining the response of presidents, from Harry Truman to Lyndon Johnson, to dissent within their own. Mr. White fashions a provocative interpretation of America's role in the cold war and questions about the potential effectiveness of policies that might have been.
Read More
How does dissent from administration advisers impact the foreign policy decisions of American presidents? White (history, U. of London, UK) analyzes this question by looking at disputes between Harry Truman and his advisers Harry Hopkins and Joseph Davies on the fate of postwar Poland, between Truman and Harry Wallace on how to approach the Soviet Union, between Eisenhower and Charles Wilson over US commitment to South Vietnam, between John Kennedy and Adlai Stevenson over policy towards Cuba, and between Lyndon Johnson and George Ball over starting the Vietnam War. He concludes that Presidents do themselves and the country a disservice when they seek to limit debate and strengthen consensus within their administrations and that it is always vitally important for policymakers to examine assumptions thoroughly. Annotation ©2007 Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)
Read Less