Description
Hooker, as the senior intelligence analyst for Iraq at US Central Command, has been "the primary analytic support to military planning for Iraq contingencies." In this monograph, he examines the role that intelligence analysis played in the military strategy for the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq. He discusses the process of producing intelligence assessments of Iraq's options in the face of conflict assessments that helped guide CENTCOM's planning of operations and assesses how closely they matched the eventual realities of Iraqi behavior and the possible reasons for errors identified. Annotation ©2005 Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)
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In this study, Gregory Hooker provides a detailed narrative of the war planning process, spanning the military's initial attempts to refocus on regime change and the government's ineffective preparation for the postwar environment. Throughout, he assesses the prewar intelligence estimates and the various problems that U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) had to overcome, including rampant media leaks, unrealistic strategic proposals, and time constraints caused by competing assumptions between senior policymakers and military planners. In doing so, he provides invaluable insight into challenges that may confront future U.S. war planning and intelligence efforts.
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